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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 John McEvoy appeals from the district court’s appellate order upholding 
his convictions for two county ordinance violations regarding his property. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged McEvoy by citation with violating Canyon County 
Ordinances requiring obtaining a building permit and prohibiting public 
nuisances.  (R., p. 8.)  The state moved to amend by replacing the citation with a 
complaint.  (R., pp. 53-56.)  McEvoy moved to dismiss, challenging the notice 
provided by the proposed amended complaint.  (R., pp. 57-71.) 
 The court granted the motion to amend (R., p. 83) and the state filed an 
amended complaint (R., pp. 84-86).  McEvoy filed a renewed motion to dismiss, 
challenging the adequacy of notice as to Count II (nuisance).  (R., pp. 92-95.)  
The trial court denied the motion.  (R., p. 97.)  McEvoy thereafter entered a 
written guilty plea.  (R., pp. 98-99.) 
 Sixteen days after entering the written guilty plea McEvoy moved to 
withdraw it.  (R., pp. 107-13.)  The court denied the motion to withdraw.  (R., p. 
115.)  The magistrate thereafter imposed sentence and entered judgment.  (R., 
pp. 116-17.)   
McEvoy filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court.  (R., pp. 118-
21.)  The district court affirmed McEvoy’s convictions, but reversed the sentence 
because the magistrate had erroneously rejected McEvoy’s refusal to be put on 






 McEvoy states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Whether the amended complaint was invalid because no 
oath was administered on the prosecutor when he filed the 
amended complaint 
 
B. Whether, if the amended complaint is invalid, the charge 
must be dismissed because the uniform citation is also 
invalid 
 
C. Whether the district court erred when it concluded that the 
magistrate properly denied Mr. McEvoy’s motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea 
 
D. Whether a structural defect existed, because the magistrate 
possessed a pre-formed highly negative opinion of the 
relevant property 
 
E. Whether the magistrate abused its discretion in imposing 
sentence 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3 (capitalization altered).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has McEvoy failed to show any jurisdictional defect in the charging 
documents? 
 
2. Has McEvoy failed to show error in the denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea? 
 
3. Has McEvoy failed to show that the magistrate should have recused 
himself? 
 
4. Is McEvoy’s claim of sentencing error moot because the district court 












 The state initiated this case by filing a uniform citation.  (R., p. 8.)  It later 
filed a complaint.  (R., pp. 84-86.)  On appeal McEvoy argues that the district 
court “erred when it concluded that the amended complaint had met the 
requirements of I.C.R. 3,” and that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 3-7.)  He further argues that the uniform citation failed to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction because it did not comply with Rule 5(g) of the Idaho 
Misdemeanor Rules.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  McEvoy’s arguments are 
frivolous. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”  State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 
C. The Magistrate Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute.”  State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 
1258 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).  Idaho courts have “subject matter 
jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the result, 




(1992).  “The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
court.”  State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004).  An 
invalid charging document does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.  Lute, 150 
Idaho at 840-41, 252 P.3d at 1258-59.   
 In this case the state filed an amended complaint alleging that McEvoy 
violated two county ordinances relating to his property.  (R., pp. 84-85.)  The 
magistrate therefore had jurisdiction.  See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009) (“An indictment confers jurisdiction when it alleges 
that the defendant committed a criminal offense in the State of Idaho.”); Rogers, 
140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132 (a “complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
court”); State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 893, 292 P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012) (a 
charging document “confers jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed 
a criminal offense within the State of Idaho”).  Because the magistrate court had 
jurisdiction, the district court did not err by affirming the denial of the motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.   
 McEvoy first asserts the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction because the 
prosecutor allegedly did not swear to the complaint.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-7.)  
Specifically, McEvoy asserts only that the complaint was not orally sworn.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (“no oath was ever administered on the prosecutor”).)  
McEvoy did not object to the lack of an oral oath, however.  (12/30/14 Tr., p. 57, 




error.  State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013) (“all claims 
of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject to the fundamental error 
test”).  To show fundamental error McEvoy bears the burden of establishing that 
the error he alleges “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record . . .), and (3) was not harmless.”  State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
McEvoy has failed to show that he had any right, constitutional or 
otherwise, to an oral oath.  On the contrary, Idaho law is clear that a written oath 
suffices.  See I.M.C.R. 2.2; I.C. § 9-1406.1  A written oath appears right in the 
amended complaint.  (R., p. 86.)  McEvoy has failed to show that lack of an oral 
oath deprived the magistrate court of jurisdiction.  Also, to the extent McEvoy 
contends the written oath was insufficient, he has failed to show fundamental 
error. 
McEvoy next argues that any failure to follow the procedural rules is a 
jurisdictional defect; that the procedural rules require a uniform citation to contain 
a date; that the uniform citation in this case does not contain such a date2; and 
                                            
1 McEvoy admits that the authority upon which he relies, State v. McClure, 159 
Idaho 758, 367 P.3d 153 (2016), “involved a document that” preceded enactment 
of I.C. § 9-1406.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  He makes no effort to explain why a 
case that dealt with an affidavit initiating contempt proceedings, and not a 
criminal complaint, and that pre-dated enactment of I.C. § 9-1406, when the 
present case does not, is relevant, much less controlling, in this case. 
 
2 The uniform citation does allege a date, specifically “12/11, 2013.”  (R., p. 8.)  
McEvoy’s claim is that the date is wrong, because the citation was filed on 
January 10, 2013.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  McEvoy’s jurisdictional claim is 




therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  This 
argument, again unpreserved and therefore reviewable only under a showing of 
fundamental error, fails at every step.   
The argument that a “uniform citation therefore must conform to the 
requirements contained in the Misdemeanor Criminal Rules, in order to confer 
subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court” (Appellant’ brief, p. 8) is specious.  
The logical fallacy in the argument that all jurisdictional defects involve violations 
of the procedural rules and therefore all violations of the rules are jurisdictional 
defects is obvious.  The applicable legal standard, stated above, clearly requires 
only a citation “alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho” in 
order to confer “subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.”  Rogers, 140 Idaho at 
228, 91 P.3d at 1132.  The date the offenses happened “is not a material 
element of the crime charged.”  State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 637, 619 P.2d 
787, 792 (1979); see also State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 46-47, 89 P.3d 881, 886-
87 (Ct. App. 2003).  Thus, the easily curable scrivener’s error in the written date 
did not deprive the magistrate court of jurisdiction.  Because the citation charged 
a crime committed in the state of Idaho regardless of the mistaken date, the trial 
court had jurisdiction.   
McEvoy makes dubious claims of failure to follow the rules of procedure 
and then tries to claim that they amount to jurisdictional error.3  None of his 
jurisdictional claims has merit. 
                                            
3 McEvoy waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the pleadings or other error by 
entry of his guilty plea.  State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 










 After McEvoy pled guilty, the state moved for a viewing of the property in 
conjunction with sentencing.  (R., pp. 100-01.)  The prosecution asserted that 
seeing the property live would be more efficient and more helpful to the 
sentencing court than viewing the photographic evidence possessed by the state.  
(3/13/15 Tr., p. 75, L. 8 – p. 78, L. 9.)  McEvoy objected.  (R., pp. 102-04.)  One 
of the bases for the objection was that the viewing was “some sort of 
replacement for a warrant” and McEvoy had not waived his Fourth Amendment 
rights.  (3/13/15 Tr., p. 79, L. 12 – p. 81, L. 2.)  The magistrate granted the 
motion, noting that the nuisance was ongoing and concluding the best method for 
sentencing was to “see exactly what we’re dealing with.”  (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, L. 8 
– p. 82, L. 6.4) 
 After failing on his objection to the viewing of his property, McEvoy moved 
to withdraw his plea.  (R., pp. 107-13.)  The basis for the motion was that 
“defendant was unaware that he could be forced to allow a law enforcement 
officer … and a judicial officer … to roam about his property in order to acquire 
additional evidence to use at sentencing or possibly another case.”  (R., p. 108; 
 
                                            
4 On appeal, McEvoy claims the viewing order “constituted a Fourth Amendment 
violation, because [it] amounted to a warrantless search.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
13.)  He does not, however, challenge the order in his issues on appeal.  




see also 3/31/15 Tr., p. 91, L. 7 – p. 92, L. 7.)  The magistrate found that the 
ordered inspection was collateral to the plea, and therefore did not render the 
plea involuntary.    (3/31/15 Tr., p. 95, L. 19 – p. 96, L. 11.)  The magistrate also 
found no just reason for withdrawal because the court was not receiving 
information it could not have otherwise received by photographic or testimonial 
evidence, and both parties had an interest in the sentencing court having a full 
understanding of the state of the property.  (3/31/15 Tr., p. 96, L. 12 – p. 97, L. 
1.)  The magistrate ultimately denied the motion.  (R., p. 115.)   
On appeal McEvoy challenges the district court’s decision affirming the 
magistrate.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-14.)  He has failed, however, to show error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action.”  State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)).   
 
C. McEvoy Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To 
Withdraw His Plea 
 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which 
provides: 
 (c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty.  A motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or 
imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest 
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of 




 Although a district court’s discretion should be “liberally exercised” when 
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of 
sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right.  State v. 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008).  Rather, “the 
defendant has the burden of showing a ‘just reason’ exists to withdraw the plea.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  Where the defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea 
before sentencing but after he has “learned of the content of the PSI or has 
received other information about the probable sentence, the district court may 
temper its liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent motive.”  State v. 
Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008) (citing State v. Mayer, 139 
Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004)). Failure to present and 
support a just or plausible reason, even absent prejudice to the prosecution, will 
weigh against granting withdrawal.  Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583.  
“[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support 
of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.”  
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted).   
 The magistrate court characterized the nuisance with which McEvoy was 
charged and convicted as “operation of a junkyard.”  (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 8-
12.)  The best way of determining “exactly what we’re dealing with” was to “take 
a walk through the property.”  (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, L. 19 – p. 82, L. 3.)  McEvoy 
has not directly challenged the court’s order for a view of the premises for 




and prevailed,5 he would have been entitled to suppression of the evidence 
gathered, not withdrawal of his guilty plea.  See State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 
891, 354 P.3d 446, 453 (2015).  McEvoy has failed to present any authority that 
a subsequent ruling in relation to what evidence will be gathered or considered 
for sentencing, even if erroneous, is a valid ground for withdrawing a guilty plea.  
See State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (“A 
party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument are lacking.”). 
 McEvoy argues that he did show a just reason for withdrawal of his plea 
“because he was not aware that his guilty plea would amount to a waiver of the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  This 
argument fails because no Fourth Amendment waiver appears on the record.  
The magistrate certainly did not claim to be basing its order for a premises view 
on any alleged waiver. (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, L. 8 – p. 82, L. 6.)  Rather, the 
magistrate’s ruling is based upon its “broad latitude in making determinations 
with regard to the appropriate sentence.”  (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 13-14.)  
McEvoy’s argument that his waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights was 
unknowing fails because he made no waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
                                            
5 The state submits the order for viewing the premises was the equivalent of a 
search warrant because it was (1) a judicial order, (2) based on probable cause 
to believe that evidence of a crime (the ongoing nuisance), (3) would be found at 
particular premises.  State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 215, 938 P.2d 1251, 1253 
(Ct. App. 1997) (“Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, a search warrant may be issued only 
upon a finding of probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a 





If McEvoy believed that the premises viewing order was an unreasonable 
search, he should have challenged that order as erroneous on appeal and 
sought the applicable remedy of suppressing evidence.  Entry of the order, even 
if erroneous, was not “good cause” to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
III. 




 During sentencing, the magistrate commented that when looking for a 
home two years previously he had driven past McEvoy’s property and was 
“dismayed” and that it “looked horrible.”  (4/3/15 Tr., p. 152, Ls. 13-20.)  After the 
court pronounced sentence the defense raised “due process concerns” about the 
judge having “a pre-formed view of Mr. McEvoy’s property before [he was] on the 
case.”  (4/3/15 Tr., p. 157, L. 17 – p. 158, L. 7.)  The magistrate judge concluded 
there was no due process violation because he was familiar with the area.  
(4/3/15 Tr., p. 158, Ls. 8-17.) 
 The district court affirmed.  (R., pp. 168-70.)  McEvoy contends the district 
court erred because the magistrate “effectively concluded that the crime was 
committed before he ever took the case.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 17.)  McEvoy has 
failed to show error because the record does not support his claim that the 
magistrate had concluded in advance that a crime had been committed.  On the 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A judge who is “biased or prejudiced for or against any party or that party’s 
case in the action” may be disqualified from hearing the case.  I.C.R. 25(b)(4).  
However, whether a judge’s involvement in a case reaches a point where 
disqualification from further participation becomes necessary is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306 
(1992); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1987). 
 
C. McEvoy Has Failed To Show Actual Or Implied Bias  
 
 Disqualification is appropriate where “there is actual prejudice against the 
litigant of such a nature as to render it improbable that the presiding judge could 
or would give the litigant a fair and impartial trial.”  State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 
329, 882 P.2d 978, 984 (Ct. App. 1994).  Under due process, prejudicial bias 
may be implied in three circumstances:  
(1) instances where the judge has a financial interest in the 
outcome of the case; (2) the situation where a judge charges a 
defendant with criminal contempt and then proceeds to try him on 
the charge; and (3) cases where a person with a personal stake in 
a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing the judge on the case. 
 
State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 459, 314 P.3d 136, 141 (2013).  It is 
axiomatic that some knowledge of the facts or circumstances of a case does not 
require a finding of bias so long as the person with knowledge may still judge the 
case fairly based on what is presented in court.  See, e.g., Nightengale v. 
Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353, 256 P.3d 755, 761 (2011) (“a trial court does not 




voir dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court 
that they will be able to remain fair and impartial”) (quoting Morris v. Thomson, 
130 Idaho 138, 141, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997)); see also State v. Ellington, 
151 Idaho 53, 70, 253 P.3d 727, 744 (2011) (“Although not always dispositive, 
the trial judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning 
partiality or bias.”). 
 Here the record does not show actual or implied bias.  The magistrate 
found no actual bias, and McEvoy has failed to show clear error or abuse of 
discretion in that finding.  Nor do the facts of this case rise to a showing of 
implied bias.  McEvoy’s claim of a due process violation thus fails.  
 
IV. 
McEvoy’s Sentencing Claim Is Moot 
 
 “An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.”  State v. 
Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted).  The 
mootness doctrine precludes review when “the issues presented are no longer 
live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Idaho 
Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 
912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 
P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). 
The district court determined that the magistrate erred when it imposed 
probation when McEvoy declined probation, and therefore it was “appropriate 




The district court “vacated” the sentence.  (R., p. 177.)  Because the district court 
vacated McEvoy’s sentence, his sentencing issue on this appeal (Appellant’s 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate decision 
of the district court. 
 DATED this 21st day of June, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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